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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does the Alaska Sex Offender Registry Act, whose only purpose and effect is to protect
the public from sex offenders, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?
2. Does the Connecticut Sex Offender Registry Act, which imposes registration
requirements only after criminal due process, violate the Due Process Clause?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FALL TERM 2002

RONALD O. OTTE and BRUCE M. BOTELHO,
Petitioners,
V.

JOHN DOE L JANE DOE, JOHN DOE II,
Respondents.

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.

JOHN DOE, et al.,
Respondents.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners Ronald Otte, Bruce Bothelo, and the Connecticut Department of Public Safety
respectfully submit this brief and request that this Court REVERSE the judgments of the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reported at
271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001). The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is reported at 259 F.3d 979 {9th Cir. 2001).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to Title 28 of United States Code section 1254 (2000), the Supreme Court may
review cases from the Court of Appeals by petition of any party to any civil case. The Alaska
Department of Public Safety petitioned this Court for review of the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
(J.A. 204). The Connecticut Department of Public Safety petitioned this Court for review of the
Second Circuit’s judgment. (J.A. 107). This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Ninth
Circuit on February 19, 2002, and a writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit on May 20, 2002.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Constitutional Provisions relevant to this case are: U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; U.S.
Const, art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The statues relevant to the disposition of this case are: 1994 Alaska Sess.
Laws 41, § 1; Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(1994); Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087 (1994); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 54-251 to 54-258 (West 2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminan' Statement
1. John Doe Ts Ex Post Facto Challenge to Alaska’s Sex Offender Registry' Law
On May 13, 1994, John Doe I filed suit claiming Alaska's Sex Offender Registrv' Lawviolated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. (J.A. 109). Doe I
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. (J.A. 109). Both parties filed for summary judgment
and the District Court granted the Slate’s motion for summary judgment on the ex post facto
claim. (J.A. 138).
Doe I appealed the district court’s judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. (J.A. 212). The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment on ex post facto grounds and
declined to review the due process claim. Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 980 (2001).
Doe I filed a writ of certiorari to this Court, which this Court granted on February 19,
2002. Otte V. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
2. John Doe’s Due Process Challenge to the Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registry Law
On February 22, 1999, John Doe filed a class action suit on behalf of all convicted sex
offenders in Connecticut claiming the Connecticut Sex Offender Law violates his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. (J.A. 63). Doe sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
prohibit the State from enforcing the registration requirements and disseminating information
from the sex offender registry. (J.A. 63). Both parties moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted summary judgment on Doe’s due process claim. (J.A. 67).
The Slate of Connecticut appealed the district court’s ruling to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. (J.A. 85). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment on the due process claim. Doe v. Department of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 39 (2001).
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This Court granted the writ of certiorari on May 20, 2002. Connecticut Dept, of Public
Safety v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002).
Statement of Facts
In 1995, a convicted child molester was arrested for the murder and rape of 7 year-old
Megan Kanka in a New Jersey suburb. (J.A. 81). The murderer was her next door neighbor, but
the local Police Department was prohibited from disclosing his presence. (J.A. 81). Asa result.
Congress proposed “Megan’s Law”, which encouraged the establishment of sexual offender
registries. (J.A. 81). All fifty states have now passed some form of “Megan’s Law”. (J.A. 81).
1.

John Doe 1 and the Alaska Sex Offender Registry

John Doe I sexually abused his daughter for two years from the time she was nine yearsold. (J.A. 212). Doe I plead no contest to sexual abuse of a minor and was sentenced to twelve
years incarceration. (J.A. 212).
Alaska enacted its Sex Offender Registration statute in 1994 and required Doe I to
register as a sex offender. (J.A. 215). The statute requires all convicted sex offenders to register.
Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(1994). At the time of registration, a sex offender must provide basic
information such as: name, address, place of employment, date of birth, convictions for sex
crimes and kidnappings, aliases, driver’s license number, physical description, anticipated
changes of address, fingerprints and photograph. ^ Sex offenders must update this information
quarterly, and notify police of any address changes. Ifr Registration responsibilities last for 15
years, but may be tolled for one year for each violation of the statute. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020.
Sex offenders may travel freely, but must notify the local police when they plan to leave a
particular state. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.030.
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The Slate of Alaska compiles the registration information and constructs a registry. The
Department of Public Safety publishes on the Internet a list of the names of sex offenders who
have registered, who have failed to register, and whose addresses cannot be verified. Alaska
Stat. § 18.65.087(1994).
2.

John Doe and the Connecticut Sex Offender Registry

The Connecticut Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Law requires
registration of people convicted of primarily sexual offenses. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-251
(West 2002). Each offender must provide basic persona! information to the State, including their
name, address, criminal histor>', and identifying factors. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-251(a). The
Department of Public Safety verifies annually a sex offender’s address by mailing a verification
card to the sex offender, which must be returned within ten days. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54257(c). When an offender moves to another state, the offender must notify both states of his
movement. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-251 to 54-254.
The type of offense of which a sex offender was convicted determines a sex offender’s
duration in the registry. Nonviolent sex offenders and offenders who committed a felony for a
sexual purpose remain in the registry for ten years. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-251(a); Conn.
Gen. Slat. Ann. § 54-254(a). Sexually violent offenders remain in the registry for life. Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-252(a).
The State of Connecticut compiles all sex offender registration information, and
publishes it on the Internet. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-258(a)(l) (West 2002). The State also
issues press releases to local media regarding the public availability of registry information once
per calendar year. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-258(a)(l) (West 2002).
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The State of Connecticut includes the following warning on the first page of any registiy
information:

“Any person who uses information in this registry to injure, harass or commit a criminal
act against any person included in the registry or any other person is subject to criminal
prosecution.”
In addition, the Sex Offender Registry website includes the following statement:
“The registry is based on the legislature’s decision to facilitate access to publicly
available information about persons convicted of sexual offenses. The Department of
Public Safety has not considered or assessed the specific risk of reoffense of any
individual prior to his or her inclusion within this registry, and has made no
determination of any individual included in the registry is currently dangerous.
Individuals included within the registry are included solely by virtue of their conviction
record and state law. The main purpose of providing this data on the internet is to make
the information more easily available and accessible, not to warn about any specific
individual.”
(J.A. 83-84).
The website also states, “This information is made available for the purpose of protecting
the public.” (J.A. 84).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”) does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause only if
it imposes additional punishment on one already punished. A law imposes punishment if the
legislature intended the law to impose punishment. If the legislature did not so intend, a law may
still impose punishment if the law’s effect is punitive. However, only the clearest proof of a
law’s punitive effect may overcome the legislature’s intent.
ASORA does not impose punishment. The intent of the Alaska Legislature was to
protect the public from sex offenders. The effect of ASORA is to protect the public from sex
offenders. While no settled test exists to determine a statute’s punitive effect, many courts
employ seven considerations. Each of these considerations reflects the statute’s non-punitive
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effect. First, ASORA has a non-punitive purpose; to protect the public from sex offenders.
Second, ASORA in no way affirmatively disables or restrains sex offenders. Third, statutes like
ASORA are historically non-punitive. Fourth, the crimes triggering ASORA do not require
scienter. Fifth, ASORA advances none of the traditional aims of punishment, either retribution
or deterrence. Sixth, ASORA does not apply only to behavior that is not already criminal.
Seventh, ASORA is not excessive because it imposes a minimal burden on sex offenders while
ser\'ing a public safety goal of the highest importance. No part of ASORA, either its intent or
effect, imposes punishment on sex offenders. Therefore, ASORA does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registry Law does not violate Respondents right to Due
Process for three key reasons: (1) Connecticut has not defamed Respondents, and any alleged
stigma is a result of Respondents’ own actions; (2) the minimal registration procedures required
by Connecticut do not infringe on a significant liberty interest and Connecticut’s interest
maintaining the Registry substantially outweighs Respondents’ liberty interests; and (3) there is
no causal connection between the alleged stigma and the registration requirements. The
registration requirements were imposed after full, criminal due process. Thus, their imposition
did not violate the Due Process Clause. This Court should reverse the decisions of the Ninth
and Second Circuits.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ALASKA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE.
A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution if the law
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“increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dept, of Corrections v.
Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3 (1995). A law does not punish simply because it “produces
some sort of disadvantage.” Id. Nor does a law punish “because it works as a detriment.” ^
This Court employs a two-prong test to determine whether a law constitutes punishment.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). The first portion of the test asks whether the
legislature intended the law be punitive. l± The second portion of the test inquires whether the
law is “so punitive either in purpose or effect” that the law should be treated as punishment. ^
at 249. If the legislature’s intent was to impose punishment, then the law violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963). If the legislature did
not intend to impose punishment, only the “clearest proof’ of the law’s punitive effect can
overcome the “legislature’s manifest intent.” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
ASORA has two principal parts: the registration provisions and the notification
provisions. As each part is logically distinct from the other, each part demands separate analysis.
Russell V. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 1997). No part of ASORA is punitive either
in intent or effect. As such, the Alaska Legislature properly applied ASORA to all convicted sex
offenders, even those convicted prior to ASORA’s enactment.
A.

The Intent of the Alaska Legislature Was to Protect the Public From Sex
Offenders, Not to Punish Sex Offenders.

A legislature’s intent appears in a law’s declared purpose, substance and structure.
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087. The purpose, structure and design of ASORA reflect the unequivocal
non-punitive intent of the Alaska legislature.
ASORA’s declared purpose is to protect the public from sex offenders. 1994 Alaska
Sess. Laws 41, §1. The public requires protection from sex offenders because sex offenders
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“pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody.” Id The law, according to the
leeislature, effectively addresses the danger sex offenders pose to the public. Id.
The circumstances leading to ASORA’s passage reflect its purpose. ASORA was passed
“amid popular fear about the release of large numbers of sex offenders into the community.”
Doe V. One, 259 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). The public fell that a system of information
collection and dissemination was necessary for their protection. Id. The legislature passed
,^SORA speci fically to address these concerns. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, § 1.
ASORA’s substance and structure effectuate its declared purpose. The statute establishes
a system of sex offender registration that is made available to the public, specifically to protect
them. Id.; Alaska Stat. §12.63.010. The prompt and frequent registration requirement ensures
that the most current information is available to better protect the public. Id The Internet
notification provision ensures that the public has easy access to the information. 1994 Alaska
Sess. Laws 41, §1; Alaska Stat. §18.65.087. In short, every aspect of ASORA is designed for the
sole purpose of protecting the public from sex offenders.
The placement of ASORA in the criminal code has no effect on the law’s non-punilive
purpose. A lawn’s label as “criminal” or “civil” is not dispositive. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
The analysis focuses on the law’s substance. Id Nothing in ASORA “suggests that the
legislature sought to create anything other than a .. . scheme designed to protect the public from
harm.” Id
B.

ASORA’s Effect Mirrors Its Intent: To Protect the Public From Sex Offenders^
Not to Punish Sex Offenders.

The non-punitive intent of the Alaska legislature can only be overcome by the “clearest
proof’ of the law’s punitive effect. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. In Hendricks, the Court
review'ed a Kansas law that required involuntary, indefinite civil commitment of sexually violent
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predators after completion of their prison term. Id at 346. The avowed intent of the Kansas
Legislature was to protect sexually violent predators from themselves, not to punish them. Id
The Hendricks Court held that involuntary civil commitment did not, by the “clearest proof,”
overcome the av^owed purpose of the Kansas Legislature. ^ If involuntary civil commitment to
a mental institution is not punishment, then neither is ASORA. Indeed, respondents muster no
proof of the law’s punitive effect because no such proof exists.
No settled standard test exists to determine whether a law’s effect is punitive. Many
courts employ seven considerations to make such a determination: (1) whether the statute has a
non-punitive purpose, (2) whether the statute imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, (3)
whether history treats similar statutes as punitive, (4) whether the statute’s provisions come into
effect only upon a finding of scienter, (5) whether the statute promotes the traditional aims of
punishment: retribution and deterrence, (6) whether the statute’s provisions apply only to
behavior that is already criminal, and (7) whether the statute is excessive in relation to its
purpose.

e.g.. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 144; Doe, 259 F.3d at 986. No guideline

exists as to the weight assigned to each factor. Every factor reflects that ASORA’s effect is
identical to its intent: to protect, not to punish.
1.

ASORA has a non-punitive purpose: protecting the public from sex
offenders.

A statute with a non-punitive purpose that is rationally connected to the statute is less
likely to have punitive effect. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. ASORA was enacted for
only one reason, which is non-punitive: to protect Alaskans from sex offenders. 1994 Alaska
Sess. Laws 41, §1. This factor indisputably weighs on the side of Petitioners.
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ASORA imposes no affirmative disabiiitv or restraint on sex offenders.

A law that imposes an affirmative disability or restraint is more likely to be punitive.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. An affirmative disability or restraint is “some sanction
approaching the infamous punishment of imprisonment.” Herbert v. Billy, 160F.3d 1131,1137
(6th Cir. 1998). For example, barring a banker from the banking industry for life does not
constitute an affirmative restraint. Hudson v. United States. 522 U.S. 93, 94 (1997). Suspending
a person’s driver’s license does not constitute an affirmative restraint. Herbert, 160 F.3d at 1137.
The registration provisions do not affirmatively disable or restrain convicted sex
offenders. In fact, convicted sex offenders are not restrained or disabled from doing anything.
The only action a sex offender must take is to register at specific, pre-designated times at a local
police department. Alaska Stat. §12.63.010. The police cannot require arbitrary or additional
registration times. A convicted sex offender may, like any other citizen, live where he chooses
to live, work where he chooses to work, and travel where he chooses to travel. Femedeer v.
Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1250 {10th Cir. 2000). Registration requires no supervision, treatment or
restriction of activities. Registration also involves a minimal time commitment.
Registration is analogous to jury duty, a non-punitive civic duty. In both cases, failure to
comply with the requirement results in criminal penalties.’ In both cases, the requirement serves
the public good. ASORA registration provisions serve the public good by protecting innocent
civilians from the sexual offenders. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, §1. Jury duty serves the public
good by allowing an accused the possibility of a fair trial by his peers. Like jury duty, ASORA
registration provisions are not punitive in effect.

' For example, a citizen who fails to report to federal court for jury duty can be fined and
imprisoned. 28 U.S.C. § 1864(b) (2002). Each state has a criminal penalty for failure to report to
jury duty. S^ e^ State of Washington, Wash. Rev. Code § 2.36.170 (1988).
11

The notification provisions do not affirmatively disable or restrain convicted sex
offenders. As with the registration provisions, the notification provisions do not disable or
restrain convicted sex offenders from doing anything.

The effect of the notification provisions on a convicted sex offender’s employment
prospects is irrelevant. Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir. 1994). “A charge that
merely makes a [convicted sex offender] less attractive to other employers but leaves open a
definite range of opportunity does not constitute a [disability or restraint].” Id. Sex offenders in
Alaska have a definite range of opportunity available to them. In fact, they are not affirmatively
prohibited from

job. If sex offenders do encounter difficulty in finding a job, that difficulty

is rooted in the “willingness of employers to hire convicted sex offenders, not on [the law
itself].” Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). A possible difficulty in
employment arises directly and exclusively from a sex offender’s own actions: committing sex
crimes. An employer’s hesitance to hire a sex offender is entirely foreseeable to a sex offender
before they committed their crime. In short, the law does nothing to sex offenders that they have
not already done to themselves.
The possibility of public misuse of the information contained on the website plays no role
in the analysis. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092. “Courts must presume that law enforcement will
obey the law and will protect offenders from vigilantism.” Id Indeed, the website forbids
misuse of the information, and violators of this admonition will be prosecuted.
Public dissemination of a person’s criminal record is not unique to ASORA notification
provisions. “When there is probable cause to believe that someone has committed a crime, our
law has always insisted on public indictment, public trial, and public imposition of sentence, all
of which necessarily entail public dissemination of information about the alleged activities of the
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accused.” Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1244. The notification provisions merely make it easier for the

public to view the information. “Internet notification works merely a technological extension,
not a sea change, in our nation’s long history of making information public regarding criminal
offenses. Interested individuals must still make an affirmative effort to retrieve the information.”
Id. Thus, this factor illustrates ASORA’s non-punitive effect.
3.

Histor>' does not treat statutes like ASORA as punitive.

A statute historically treated as punishment is more likely to have a punitive effect.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. The history of sex offender registration is brief Doe, 259
F.3d at 988. However, government laws imposing civic duties on citizens with criminal
sanctions for failure to comply have a longer history. The United States has created a mandatory
draft during wartime as a way to populate the militar>' forces. U.S. Government, Selective
Sen'ice Registration <http://ww^'.sss.gov/regist.htm> (accessed October 10,2002). A citizen
who evaded the draft was subject to criminal prosecution. Fleet Reserve Association, Military'
Update <hUp:www.fra.org/mil-up/milup-archive/8-15-02-milup.html> (accessed October 10,
2002). Like ASORA, draft laws were not punitive in effect.
Public dissemination of accurate information is not historically punitive. E.B. v.
Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099-1100 (3d Cir. 1997). Punishment usually takes the form of
incarceration, incapacitation or rehabilitation. Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475. Public dissemination
of accurate information does not fall into any of these categories. Id Incarceration requires time
in a prison, which the notification provisions do not. Id. Incapacitation requires restriction on
movement, which the notification provisions do not. R Rehabilitation requires an attempt to
reform the criminal, which the notification provisions do not. Id. As such, this factor reflects the
non-punitive effect of the notification provisions.
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4.

ASORA does not require scienter.

A “statute whose provisions come into effect only upon a finding of scienter” is more
likely to have punitive effect. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. The analysis does not focus
on whether a majority' of the crimes enumerated in a statute require scienter, but only whether all
of the enumerated crimes require scienter. Id.
Scienter is not a requirement for imposition of ASORA. Certain crimes enumerated in
ASORA do not require scienter, such as conviction for sexual abuse for a minor under 13 years
of age. Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.434; 11.41.445(b). As such, this factor speaks to ASORA’s nonpunitive effect.
5.

ASORA serves neither of the traditional aims of punishment: retribution
and deterrence.

“When a statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence
- its effect is more likely to be considered punitive.” Otte, 259 F.3d at 989, citing MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. at 168. A statute may promote retribution in several ways. First, a statute
may promote retribution if it places an “onerous" burden on an already convicted defendant,
such as a duty analogous to that placed on a probationer or parolee. Otte, 259 F.3d at 990.
Second, a statute may promote retribution if failure to comply with the statute’s provisions
results in unduly severe penalties. Id Third, a sex offender registration statute may promote
retribution if the duration of the reporting requirement does not correlate to the risk posed to the
public,
ASORA registration requirement serves no retributive purpose. First, the registration
provisions place a negligible burden on sex offenders. Sex offenders must simply report to the
local police station four times per year and update basic personal information. Alaska Stat.
§12.63.010. This registration responsibility is not analogous to the burden placed on a
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“probationer or parolee.” O^, 259 F.3d at 990. While both sets of responsibilities contain some
facial similarities, such outward similarities make no statement as to the punitive effect of the
j-egistration requirements. The mere fact that a provision may be punitive in one circumstance
fias little bearing on whether it may be punitive in another. A provision that requires a citizen to
appear at a government building and imposes criminal sanction for failure to do so is not
necessarily punitive in effect. 28 U.S.C. § 1864(b) (2002). For example, citizens of the United
States must perform jury duty if they receive notice. Id. Jury duty can occur annually, and may
last months. U.S. Federal District Court, Jury’ Duty Frequently Asked Questions
<http://www.lawd.uscourts.gov/iurv/faq iurv.html> (accessed October 10,2002). Failure to
perform jury duty can result in criminal prosecution. 28 U.S.C. §1864(b). Clearly, jury duty
docs not have a punitive effect. In short, comparing the registration requirement to probation or
parole serves no useful purpose because the provision could just as easily be compared favorably
to a traditionally non-punitive aim.
Second, the registration requirements do not impose an unduly severe punishment for
failing to register. The law imposes an additional year of registration for each year that a sex
offender fails to register. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(2). There is no doubt that sex offenders do
not like the registration requirement or its penalties. (J.A. 111-113). They feel that it invades
their privacy and destroys their lives. (J.A. 111-113). However, the law does not assess a
provision’s punitive purpose from the perspective of the criminal. Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263,
1284 (2d Cir. 1997). As such, the Alaska legislature built into ASORA a penalty for failing to
register. Alaska Slat. §12.63.010. The penalty encourages sex offenders to register. A sex
offender who fails to register poses a serious risk to the public safety. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws
41, § 1. To minimize such risks, the law contains a strong incentive to register. The mere fact
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that a regulatory, non-punitive law contains a punishment for failure to comply does not give the
entire law a punitive effect. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089-90. For example, criminal sanctions for
failing to report to jury duty do not give the law' requiring jury duty a punitive effect. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1864(b).
Third, the duration of the reporting requirement directly correlates to the risk posed to the
public safety. ASORA requires aggravated sex offenders to register more frequently than nonaggravated sex offenders. Alaska Stat. §12.63.020(a). The assumption of this provision is that
aggravated sex offenders pose a greater risk to the public than non-aggravated offenders. This is
an accurate assumption.^ A sex offender convicted of rape poses a graver risk to the public than
a sex offender convicted of second degree sexual abuse of a minor. ^ Therefore, the public
safety is better preserved by keeping a closer watch of certain classes of sex offenders. Id.
ASORA ser\'es this purpose by requiring the most dangerous offenders to register more often.
The registration requirement’s possible deterrent effect bears no analytic weight. The
fact that a statute has a deterrent effect makes no statement as to whether the statute is punitive in
effect. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97. “To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders
sanctions criminal for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the government’s
ability to engage in effective regulation.” ^ For example, a law that lowers the speed limit on
freeways is designed to increase safety by deterring speeding. The fact that the law deters
speeding does not make the law’s purpose punitive.
The notification provisions also have no retributive effect. The notification provisions
impose no burden on sex offenders. The notification provisions simply streamline the process by

e^ R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A meta-Analysis of
Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 348-362

‘

(Vol. 66, No. 2, 1998).
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which the public can view information already available to it. The degree to which this process
has been streamlined is irrelevant. “Though the vast difference between the public records that
miuht be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives and local police
stations . . . and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information is
relevant in some legal issues. . . that difference does not add punitive consequence to an
otherwise regulatory measure ” Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1280.
The notification provision’s possible deterrent effect bears no analytical weight. As with
the rcuistration requirement, a statute that ser\'es a deterrent purpose may be just as easily civil as
criminal. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996). Thus, this factor illustrates
ASORA's non-punitive effect.
6.

\V0iether a statute applies only to behavior that is already criminal is
irrelevant in determining the statute’s punitive effect.

A statute whose provisions apply only to behavior that is already criminal is more likely
to have a punitive effect. Mendoza-Marlinez, 372 U.S. at 168. This factor should bear no
wci uht. A statute does not have a punitive effect simply because the behavior triggering the
statute is criminal. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089. This Court has noted “on a number of occasions
that Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or
omission.” United States v. Ward , 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)). Thus, this factor plays no role in analyzing the statute’s punitive
effect.
7.

ASORA is not excessive because its requirements are justified by the
extreme importance of protecting the public from sex offenders.

A statute that appears “excessive in relation to ... its alternative purpose” is more likely
to have a punitive effect. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. This factor weighs a statute’s
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purpose against its effect. ASORA is not excessive in relation to its purpose: protecting the
public from sex offenders. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, § 1.
To determine whether a law is excessive in relation to its purpose, it is necessary to look
first at whether the law imposes a burden. Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 476. ASORA imposes a
minimal burden on sex offenders. The registration requirements simply require a sex offender to
report to a police department four time per year and update basic personal information. Alaska
Stat. §12.63.010. The registration requirements do not limit a sex offender’s freedom: a sex
offender may travel, work, marry, and live as he pleases. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250. The
notification requirements also impose no burden, as they do not require sex offenders to do
anything. Ostracism or loathing by the community does not constitute a burden. Gregory, 24
F.3d at 788. If community members ostracize or loathe sex offenders, this reaction is rooted in
the fear or revulsion of an act the sex offender chose to commit. ^ In other words, a sex
offender is burdened by his own actions, not the law.
The lack of a risk assessment mechanism does not increase the burden on certain,
allegedly less dangerous offenders. A registration law that lacks a risk assessment mechanism
cannot be excessive, because no reliable risk assessment mechanism exists.^ It is currently
impossible to determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy how likely a sex offender is to
commit another sex crime. Id. The lack of reasonable certainty as to a sex offender’s likelihood
of re-offense combined with the grave danger if reoffense does occur requires that all sex
offenders be posted on the website.

^ Disagreement rages between experts in this field. Some experts say that the actual rate of
recidivism among sex offenders is 90%. See e.g., J.L. Frenken & D. Van Beek, Sex Offender
Research and Treatment in the Netherlands. Other experts estimate this rale at about 13%. See
e.g., R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A meta-Analysis of Sexual
Offender Recidivism Studies, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 348-362 (Vol. 66,
No. 2, 1998).
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Unlimited public access to the sex offender registry also does not increase the burden on
sex offenders. Members of the public in one geographic location have no reason to visit a sex
offender registry for a different geographic location. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. Even if
people in one area visit the sex offender website in another area, it has no bearing on ASORA’s
punitive effect. People outside a particular area have no use for such information. l± As such,
a statute cannot be punitive if it makes irrelevant information available. That people may misuse
the information on the sex offender registry' is not a concern. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092. “Courts
must presume that law enforcement will obey the law and will protect offenders from
vigilantism.” Id. That the information may have a negative impact on the employment prospects
and lives of sex offenders is also not a concern. Gregory, 24 F.3d at 788. As noted above, the
website merely facilitates access to already public information. As such, Internet access puts no
additional burden on sex offenders than a need-to-know only registry. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at
1253.
The next step in determining whether a law is excessive is to look at the strength of the
law’s purpose. Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 476. In this case, ASORA addresses a public policy of the
strongest importance: protecting the public from sex criminals. It is hard to imagine a more just
and important purpose than to protect society from the sex offenders." In Alaska, the problems
posed by sex crimes are particularly severe. Standing Together Against Rape, Statistics
<http://wu^.star.ak.org/statistics.htm> (accessed October 10, 1999). Alaska’s rape rate is 2.4
limes the national average. Id. Also, Alaska has six times the national average of reported child

" In 1994, the year that ASORA was enacted, 316,000 estimated rapes or attempted rapes were
committed in the U.S., one every 1.6 minutes. The number of estimated rapes increased by 5%
from 1993 to 1994. An Abuse, Rape, Domestic Violence Aid And Resource Collection, Rape
Statistics <http://ww'\\'.aardvarc.org/rape/about/stats.shtml> (accessed October 10, 2002).
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sexual assault. Id. Moreover, no definitive scientific evidence exists as to the recidivism rates
for sex offenders.^ Therefore, extra care must be taken to limit the deleterious effect that sex
offenders will have on society once they are released.
Every part of the statute focuses exclusively on the public policy goal. The registration
provisions ensure that the public will have current and accurate information about the physical
features and whereabouts of local sex offenders. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, §1. The
notification provisions ensure that the interested public can view’ this information with minimal
effort. Id.
In sum, all useful factors point to ASORA’s non-punitive effect. The intent of the Alaska
legislature aligns perfectly with the law'’s effect. Therefore, ASORA does not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause.
II. BECAUSE THE CONNECTICUT SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY ACT IMPOSES
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS ONLY AFTER CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS, IT
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that States not deprive “any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Title 42 of United States Code
section 1983 allows federal suits against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute ... of
any State[,].. . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” (2000). Thus, an individual
must have been deprived of a “right, privilege[], or immunit[y]” to state a claim under section
1983. Moreover, this deprivation must have been effected without due process. Respondents are

^ Recidivism rate estimates vary between 13% and 90%. See e.g., J.L. Frenken & D. Van Beek,
Sex Offender Research and Treatment in the Netherlands; R. Karl Hanson & Monique T.
Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 348-362 (Vol. 66, No. 2, 1998).
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unable to meet either requirement. In their eagerness to blend back into society, they have
overlooked this Court’s restrictions on the use of section 1983, and thus fail to state a claim.
In Paul V. Davis, this Court established specific restrictions on the use of section 1983 to
prevent a “font of tort law [from being] superimposed upon whatever systems may already by
administered by the Stales.” 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). This Court was concerned that section
1983 would make every deleterious state action a federal case. Id. at 699. As a result,

held

that a State-effected injury to reputation was not a deprivation of a “right, privilege[], or
immunit[y]” under section 1983, and would not support a section 1983 suit. Id at 702. In what
has widely become known as the “stigma-plus” test, Paul held that some additional liberty or
property interest must be implicated. Id. at 708-709. Paul carefully distinguished previous cases
by noting that they involved actions that not only stigmatized the plaintiffs, but also altered their
legal status under State law. Id. at 708-710. Paul further required a causal relationship between
the stigma and the status change. Id. at 711.
Thus, to state a section 1983 claim under this Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis,
Respondents must show' the deprivation without due process of a significant liberty or property
interest. Because injury to reputation does not qualify as a significant liberty or property interest,
any injury to reputation must have resulted in some other deprivation. Respondents cannot show
that Connecticut’s registration requirements were imposed without due process because they are
only imposed after a conviction. Respondents are instead confusing the issue by claiming that
Connecticut’s notification requirements were effected without due process. But the notification
requirements have nothing to do with the registration requirements. Thus, even if both of
Respondents claims were supported, they cannot show that any significant liberty or property
interest was deprived without due process.

21

Respondents misapply this Court’s “stigma-plus” test, and fail to stale a claim as a result.
Under their own test, Respondents must satisfy three requirements: (1) Respondents must have
been defamed; (2) Respondents must have suffered the deprivation of some significant liberty or
property interest; and, most importantly, (3) the deprivation must have been a result of the
defamation. Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-709. A failure to meet any one of these requirements would
invalidate Respondents’claim. Id, Yet they fail all three. The Second Circuit’s contrary ruling
was a significant departure from this Court’s holdings.
A. Respondents Fail to Show Defamation.
Respondents claim that Connecticut has defamed them by publishing their conviction
information. Defamation is defined as “the act of harming the reputation of another by making a
false statement to a third person.” Black’s Law Dictionary 341 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., abr. 7th
ed.. West 2000). Respondents claim that publication of their conviction information states or
implies that they are currently dangerous individuals or that they are particularly likely to be
dangerous. The allegation of defamation must fail for three reasons: (1) the State of Connecticut
specifically disclaims that any registrant was determined to be dangerous and thus does not make
the alleged statement; (2) the State of Connecticut has only published true information and is
thus protected by the First Amendment; and (3) any stigma resulting from the notification
requirements are a result of Respondents’ own convictions for sex offenses, not any State
determination.
1.

Connecticut did not make any allegation of dangerousness.

Connecticut included a disclaimer in its publication of the Sex Offender Registry which
stated:
The Department of Public Safety has not considered or assessed the specific risk of
reoffense with regard to any individual prior to his or her inclusion within this registry,
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and has made no determination that any individual included in the registry’ is currently
dangerous. Individuals included within the registry are included solely by virtue of their
conviction record and state law. The main purpose of providing this data on the Internet
is to make the information more easily available and accessible, not to warn about any
specific individual.
(J.A. 83) (emphasis added). This disclaimer is excerpted from a larger notice that also warns that
the use of any information published by the Registry to “injure, harass, or commit a criminal act
against any other person" is expressly prohibited. Id. Thus, the State of Connecticut has made
an affirmative effort to state the precise opposite of Respondents allegations. A full three
sentences in the above quoted material emphasize that “no determination” has been made about
any individual, that individuals are included “solely by virtue of their conviction record”, and
that the purpose is “not to warn about any specific individual.” Connecticut then goes on to
protect Respondents with language that warns readers against the improper use of registry
information. Respondents' allegations that Connecticut has labeled them currently dangerous or
particularly likely to be dangerous must fail when confronted with the opposite language in the
very publication Respondents are challenging.
Respondents further argue that the act of publishing the registry implies that Respondents
arc particularly likely to be dangerous despite Connecticut’s affirmative statements to the
contrary. Were it not for Connecticut’s express disclaimer, this implication might follow from
the publication of the Registry. However, even this implication must fail when contrasted
against actual words in the publication. Even if a reasonable person could infer from mere
publication of registry information that a registrant is particularly likely to be dangerous, no
reasonable person could still infer this after reading Connecticut’s disclaimer specifically
denying this inference. If a reader continues to draw the inference after reading the disclaimer, it
is contrary to Connecticut’s express intention. Defamation does not occur when a third party
draws an inference against the express wishes of a declarant; it occurs only when a declarant
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actually makes a false statement. Any conclusion that Connecticut has made the alleged
statement after it actually states the opposite would be a significant departure from the common
law of defamation.
2.

Because Connecticut has simply published true information, it could not
have made any false statements and is entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment.

At no point have Respondents alleged that any information actually published in the
Registry is false. The Registry is simply a database of true, easily verified information. The
State of Connecticut collects and maintains registrants’ names, identifying factors, criminal
history records, and residence addresses. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-251 (West 2002). The
Connecticut Department of Public Safety makes this information available to the public through
the Internet. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-258(a)(l) (West 2002). The State of Connecticut has a
strong interest in the integrity of the information and has implemented procedural safeguards to
ensure its accuracy. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-251 to 54-254 (requiring registrants to complete
periodic verifications forms). Indeed, although Respondents claim that the publication of this
information somehow creates a false statement, no part of the Registry actually is false. If any
information were false, the State of Connecticut would be required to immediately correct it
pursuant to its own laws. Respondents are therefore asking this Court to enjoin the publication
of true information. This request is untenable both because true information cannot be
defamatory and because it asks this Court to restrict Connecticut’s freedom of speech.
Connecticut, like private individuals and newspapers, should have a constitutional right
to publish legally obtained, truthful information. Indeed, any injunction preventing private
individuals or newspapers fi'om publishing this information would be highly suspect as violative
of our First Amendment: “Prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” Nebraska Press Assn, v. Stuart, 427
24

U.S. 539, 559 (1976). While this Court has refused to hold that truthfulness is an absolute
defense to publication liability, s^ Florida Star v.

491 U.S. 524, 532-533 (1989), this

Court has held that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.” Smith v. Daily Mail Publg. Co..
443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). Moreover, this Court has never upheld the punishment of a newspaper
for the publication of truthful information. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530. Thus, Respondents are
asking this Court to restrict Connecticut’s freedom of speech further than it would restrict a
newspaper’s. Any newspaper in this country would enjoy the protection of the First Amendment
if it chose to publish information from the Registry. The State of Connecticut should enjoy the
protections of the First Amendment as well.
Thus, Respondents’ claims of defamation directly collide with the First Amendment.
Respondents concede that all of the Registry information is true, yet they imply that any
newspaper publishing this information would be subject to a defamation suit. But a newspaper’s
liability is expressly rejected in Daily Mail and Florida Star: lawfully obtained, truthful
information may be published absent a contrary state interest of the highest order. The State of
Connecticut has lawfully obtained registrant’s information, the information is true, and the state
interest is in publishing the material. Any injunction preventing the dissemination of
uncontestedly true information would be a significant departure from this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence.
3.

Any perceived stigma results from Respondents’ own convictions for sex
offenses.

Respondents may honestly perceive a stigma resulting from the publication of their
conviction information. This stigma may frustrate Respondents’ abilities to obtain employment
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or make friendships. But this stigma is not a result of Connecticut’s notification requirements.
This stigma is a result of Respondents’ own convictions for sex offenses. Thus, evidence of
stigma is not sufficient to show that Connecticut has defamed Respondents. Respondents must
show that a stigma resulting from the notification requirements is distinct from the stigma
resulting from Respondents’ sex offenses. Respondents have made no showing. A criminal
conviction for a sexual offense carries a heavy social stigma, but it is a stigma that Respondents
assumed, not one that Connecticut imposed.
B. Sex Offender Registration Requirements Do Not Deprive Respondents of a
Significant Liberty Interest.
This Court’s opinion in Paul v. Davis requires the deprivation of a significant liberty or
property interest to support a section 1983 suit. 424 U.S. at 701. Respondents concede that their
reputation is not a significant property interest within the meaning of section 1983, and
alternatively claim that the Sex Offender registration requirements deprive them of a significant
liberty interest. This Court has not precisely defined the concept of liberty within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but it has sketched the broad outlines with specific holdings:
the term [liberty] has received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). This meaning of liberty encompasses
fundamental freedoms, and this Court’s holdings further emphasize that due process is
implicated only when individuals are deprived of interests that “have been initially recognized
and protected by state law.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 710. Respondents contend that the registration
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requirements are so onerous as to deprive them of one of the significant liberty interests.
However, a survey of this Court’s liberty and due process cases does not support this conclusion.
This Court’s cases suggest that a liberty interest must be meaningfully terminated to
trigger a due process violation. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, this Court held that a law
enforcement prohibition on the sale of alcohol to a specific individual implicated a liberty
interest because the right to purchase and consume alcohol is guaranteed and protected by the
state. 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971). Thus the deprivation of the right to purchase and buy alcohol
requires due process. Id. Likewise, in Bell v. Burson, this Court held that a state recognized the
right to operate a vehicle on the state’s highways by issuing drivers’ licenses and vehicle
registrations. 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). Any termination of this right required procedural due
process. Id. at 542-543. Again, this Court noted the arbitrary and meaningful obstruction of a
liberty interest when it ended educational segregation in D.C. schools. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). In each of these cases, the significant liberty interest was
meaningfully terminated. In Constantineau, the plaintiff was prevented from purchasing alcohol
while his fellow citizens could drink. 400 U.S. at 436. In Bell, the plaintiff was prevented from
driving while his fellow citizens drove. 402 U.S. at 542. In Bolling, minor children were
prevented from attending schools while their peers learned. 347 U.S. at 499-500. No such
termination of Respondents’ liberty interests are effected by Connecticut’s registration
requirements.
Respondents are required to register and verify their registration information on a regular
basis. They are not prevented from traveling, driving, learning, marrying, raising children,
worshipping God, contracting, or any other of the myriad freedoms that are enjoyed by U.S.
citizens. The registration requirements do not prevent employment, require a significant
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financial burden, or circumscribe the freedom of speech. If Respondents decide to move, they
are not required to maintain contact with the original state. They are not prevented from leaving
this country. Indeed, the registration requirements do not prevent Respondents from enjoying
any of the freedoms protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and Due Process. None of this
Court’s cases support the assertion that a simple procedure to verify residency or update Registryinformation infringes on any significant liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, the State of Connecticut’s strong interest in maintaining accurate residency
and Registry information substantially outweighs any minor inconvenience suffered by
Respondents. Even if this Court were to recognize a liberty interest infringed by the registration
requirements, “determining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause
does not end the inquiry; ‘whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.’” Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept, of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)). Thus, Respondents must further show that any claimed liberty
interest also outweighs Connecticut’s interest in maintaining Registry information. The slight if any - liberty interest Respondents have in avoiding the registration requirements are
substantially outweighed by Connecticut’s interest in maintaining the Registry.
Connecticut created the Registry and mandates its availability to law enforcement and the
public “for the purpose of protecting the public.” (J.A. 84). The Registry is administered by the
Connecticut Department of Public Safety. By implication, Connecticut places substantial
importance on the availability of Registry information. Indeed, this Court should take judicial
notice of the law’s prevalence in our nation; the federal government has created incentives to
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encourage its passage, and every state has enacted some kind of sex offender registry. Likewise,
this suggests the importance our nation places on the availability of sex offender information.
Sex crimes are distinctly serious crimes, and this Court has repeatedly noted that
distinction: “[Rape] is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total
contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim . .. Short of homicide, it
is the ultimate violation of self . . . Because it undermines the community’s sense of security,
there is public injury' as well.” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). “[W]e are daily
reminded of the tragic reality of rape .. .Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537. Sex crimes against
minors are particularly heinous. The State of Connecticut has both a duty and a right to protect
its citizens against these types of crimes, and thus Connecticut’s interest in this Registry cannot
he understated. The registration requirements complained of by Respondents are minimal and
insignificant when balanced against this compelling state interest.
In summary, Respondents have failed to identify a significant liberty interest affected by
the imposition of the registration requirements. Respondents have further failed to indicate how
any claimed liberty interest outweighs Connecticut’s substantial interest in maintaining the
Registry. Any minimal liberty interest balanced against the substantial public safety interests
suggest that convicted sex offenders may properly be required to bear the slight burden of
periodically verifying their registry information. To the extent that Respondents cannot identify
a significant liberty interest, they fail to state a claim under section 1983. To the extent that
Respondents cannot show that any liberty interest outweighs Connecticut’s interests, they simply
fail in their claim. In any case, Respondents again fall short of challenging Connecticut’s duly
enacted Sex Offender Registry Law.

29

C. There Is No Causal Connection Between the Alleged Defamation and the
Registration Requirements, and Thus the Stigma-Plus Test Is Not Satisfied.
The stigma-plus test is only satisfied when the alleged stigma has directly caused the plus
element. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. A key element of this analysis is the relationship between the
stigma and the legitimate liberty or property interest. Id. If the stigma and the liberty interest are
not causally related, then any due process violation with regard to the stigma does not imply a
due process violation with regard to the legitimate interest. Id.
This Court created the stigma-plus test to remedy a situation in which the government
defames an individual and thereby deprives them of a liberty or property interest. Id. In Paul,
this Court held that injury to an individual’s reputation did not constitute the deprivation of a
significant liberty or property interest, and thus did not violate the Due Process Clause. Id at
712. However, Paul recognized that if an injury to reputation is effected without due process,
and results in the deprivation of a legitimate liberty or property interest, then that deprivation
would have also resulted without due process. Id. For example, in Constantineau this Court held
that a citizen’s right to due process was violated when an officer posted defamatory signs that
resulted in a citizen’s inability to purchase alcohol. 400 U.S. at 435-436. As explained by this
Court in Paul, because the signs were posted without due process, the deprivation of the right to
purchase alcohol was also effected without due process. 424 U.S. at 708-709.
In the present case, even if Connecticut has stigmatized Respondents, there is no causal
connection between that stigma and the registration requirements. The registration requirements
result from a criminal conviction regardless of whether public notification occurs. Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 54-251 to 54-254. Any failure of due process on the part of the risk determination cannot
show a failure of due process on the part of the registration requirements. The registration
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requirements were imposed after full, criminal due process. Therefore, any deprivation does not
violate the Due Process Clause, and Respondents fail to state a claim under section 1983.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should REVERSE the judgments of the
Second and Ninth Circuits.
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